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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal from a final judgment and 
order of the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. An Order of Dismissal with prejudice was granted to the 
defendant and filed on July 25, 1998. (R. at 112-115.) The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment when no genuine 
issues of material fact exist regarding the validity and 
authenticity of the signatures on the original Release? 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. V-l Oil Co. v. 
Utah State Tax Comiri'n, 942 P.2d 906, 910 (Utah 1996). When 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals 
determines whether the trial court erred in applying governing 
law and whether it correctly held that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1989) . 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 
denied plaintiff's Motion to Amend her Complaint to add fraud and 
bad faith claims since she was unable to show that her altered 
Release reflected the agreement of the parties? 
Standard of Review: A motion to amend should not be 
granted where the pleader does not set forth a legally sufficient 
claim. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389 (Utah 1996). The 
Court of Appeals will not overturn a trial court's denial of a 
motion to amend a pleading absent an abuse of discretion. Id. 
3. Should damages be awarded to the defendant for 
having to defend a frivolous appeal? 
Standard of Review: Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court may award damages upon 
the request of a party or upon its own motion. A frivolous 
appeal is "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good-faith argument to extend, 
modify or reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-16 governs when parol 
evidence is admissible. This statute is known as the best 
evidence rule, which states that n[t]here can be no evidence of 
the contents of a writing, other than the writing itself" except 
for limited circumstances that do not apply to this case. In 
addition, the best evidence rule is also found in the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 1002, which reads: 
To provide the content of a writing, 
recording, or photograph, the original 
writing, recording or photograph is required, 
except as otherwise provided in these rules 
or by other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court of this State or by Statute. 
(Emphasis added.) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-17 governs writings that 
bear obvious alterations. It reads: 
The party producing as genuine a writing 
which has been altered, or appears to have 
been altered after its execution in a part 
material to the question in dispute must 
account for the appearance of alteration. He 
may show that the alteration was made by 
another without his concurrence, or was made 
with the consent of the parties affected by 
it, or otherwise properly or innocently made, 
For the text of Utah Code Ann.§ 78-25-16, please see the Addendum to 
this Brief. 
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or that the alteration does not change the 
meaning or language of the instrument. If he 
does this, he may give the writing in 
evidence, but not otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.) 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) s t a t e s in pa r t : 
(a) Otherwise a par ty may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by wri t ten consent 
of the adverse par ty ; and leave sha l l be 
freely given when j u s t i c e so requi res . 2 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 s t a t e s tha t the court 
may award reasonable a t to rneys ' fees to a preva i l ing par ty i f the 
court determines tha t the act ion was without merit and not 
brought or asser ted in good f a i t h . 3 In addi t ion, Rule 33(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides tha t a par ty may 
be awarded damages for having to defend a frivolous appeal.4 
2The complete r u l e i s s e t out in the Addendum to t h i s Br ief . 
3For the f u l l t e x t of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, p l ea se see the Addendum 
to t h i s Br ief . 
4The complete r u l e i s s e t out in the Addendum to t h i s Br ief . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose from an automobile accident that 
occurred on or about September 23, 1990. Nine months later, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the liability carrier, and 
plaintiff reached a settlement and an original Release was signed 
by the plaintiff, Vickie M. Nielsen, at the advice of counsel. 
Ms. Nielsen's attorney also signed the agreement. This original 
Release released the defendant and her insurer from all personal 
injury and property damage claims arising from the automobile 
accident• 
One-and-a-half years atter the original Release was 
signed, Ms. Nielsen's counsel contacted Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company's claims adjuster, Mr. David K. Gehris, notifying 
Mr. Gehris that there "may" be a claim made regarding personal 
injuries from this accident but that they had already settled the 
property damage dispute. 
Due to the large volume of claims handled by 
Mr. Gehris, he took Ms. Nielsen's counsel at his word, and did 
not go back and review the original Release on file; instead, he 
began corresponding with Ms. Nielsen's counsel regarding the 
personal injury claim. When a new claims adjuster took over the 
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file in August of 1997, she reviewed the original Release, which 
plainly released the defendant and her insurer from any personal 
injury claim or property damage claim resulting from the 
automobile accident. She then informed defense counsel, who 
immediately informed plaintiff's counsel of the original Release 
and brought a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint on the 
basis of the original Release-
Plaintiff's counsel admitted and the trial court found 
that the signatures on the original Release are the authentic 
signatures of Ms. Nielsen and her counsel, and that only one 
original Release existed. Plaintiff and her counsel had no 
reasonable explanation for the altered Release. After 
considering all the evidence presented by Ms. Nielsen, the trial 
court found that no ambiguous language existed in the original 
Release and that the parties' intent must be determined solely 
from the language of the original Release without result to parol 
evidence. The trial court granted the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and denied plaintiff's Motion to Amend her Complaint to 
add new claims. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about September 23, 1990, an automobile 
accident involving plaintiff Vickie M. Nielsen and defendant 
Mary J. Hefferon occurred. Ms. Hefferon was killed m that 
accident. (R. 32.) 
2. In January 1991, Ms. Nielsen retained legal 
counsel, Paul M. Halliday, Jr. (R. 57.) 
3. On February 28, 1991, Ms. Nielsen's counsel 
contacted Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual"), 
via a claims adjuster, Mr. David K Gehrig, to inform Liberty 
Mutual that Mr. Halliday had been retained to represent 
Ms. Nielsen's interests in the automobile accident that resulted 
m "personal property damage and injuries to our client." (R. 
61, f 1.) 
4. On March 11, 1991, Liberty Mutual sent a check to 
Ms. Nielsen m the amount of $1,000.00. (R. 123 4:8-10.) On 
this check is a note that says it is for the total loss of her 
vehicle. (R. 123 at 4:17-19.) 
5. On May 30, 1991, Liberty Mutual settled the 
property damage on Ms. Nielsen's husband's vehicle and sent a 
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settlement draft of $4,757.69 to him. The note on the draft that 
says that it is for the total loss of his vehicle. (R. 67.) 
6. Finally, on June 5, 1991, Liberty Mutual issued a 
settlement draft to Ms. Nielsen for $3,445.00. The note on the 
draft states "final settlement." (R. 76.) The day after this 
draft was issued, Ms. Nielsen signed, and her attorney witnessed 
by his signature, the original Release which discharged 
Ms. Hefferon and Liberty Mutual of any claims that arose from the 
automobile accident, including personal injuries and property 
damage. (R. 37.)5 
7. Mr. Gehris of Liberty Mutual understood that the 
settlement was a release of all claims, including personal injury 
and property damage. (R. 30.) 
8. Liberty Mutual did not hear from Ms. Nielsen or 
her attorney until a year and a half later, on December 15, 1992, 
when Ms. Nielsen's counsel wrote to Liberty Mutual: 
"We settled the property dispute back in June 
1991. 
5Attached to this Brief in the Addendum is a color copy of the original 
Release. The trial court chose to return the original Release to defense 
counsel for safekeeping, so the original was not made part of the record. (R. 
123 at 26:23-27:4.) It will be produced to the Court of Appeals at the appeal 
hearing or as directed by the Court of Appeals. 
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It appears that our client may need some back 
surgery to correct injuries she received from 
this accident. We are monitoring this matter 
and we are notifying you that there will be a 
claim made regarding personal injuries from 
this accident." 
(R. 77, 1 2.) 
9. Liberty Mutual took Mr. Halliday at his word and 
did not double check the contents of the original Release it had 
on file until August 1997, when a new claims adjuster was 
assigned to the file. She reviewed the file and discovered the 
discharged claims in the original Release. She then notified 
defense counsel of this for the first time, and defense counsel 
informed plaintiff's counsel of defendant's intent to rely on the 
Release. (R. 123 at 6:22-7:8; 8:5-11.) 
10. A hearing was held on the motions on February 26, 
1998, where, for the first time, Ms. Nielsen's counsel requested 
to examine the original Release. (R. 123.)b After he examined 
the original Release, and consulted with his client, 
Ms. Nielsen's counsel admitted to the court that their signatures 
were indeed, on the document. (R. 123 at 18:3-5.) 
DMs. Nielsen's counsel contended that "despite numerous requests [the 
defendant] failed to make the so-called "original" of the release available to 
plaintiff's counsel for inspection." (R. 97.) However, he never once 
requested to see the original Release. (R. 123 at 9:20-10:2.) 
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11. When asked by the court if Ms. Nielsen's counsel 
had an original release on file, Ms. Nielsen's counsel replied he 
did not, that he had only received "just that one, your Honor." 
(R. 123 at 18:13-19.) 
12. At the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the following exchange occurred between Judge Thorne and Paul M. 
Halliday, Jr.: 
THE COURT 
MR. HALLIDAY: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HANSEN: 
THE COURT: 
Doesn't the best evidence rule require, 
though, that I rely first on the 
original signatures as opposed to a 
photocopy of something that's been 
changed? 
Well, your Honor, I believe that we need 
to examine that document to see if it's 
a forgery. We have testimony that shows 
that that was not our understanding. We 
have a copy of what I had in my file. 
Well, are you disputing, then, that 
these signatures are yours and your 
client's? 
May I examine that, your Honor? 
Now, you're telling me these are a 
forgery, then that's . . . 
[A lengthy delay while Ms. Nielsen and Mr. Halliday 
looked at the Release.] 
MR. HANSEN: I think it's this document with the one 
attached to his affidavit as well. 
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THE COURT: If you're indicating that this is a 
forgery, then that's raising the stakes 
of this going both ways considerably. 
Mr. Halliday? 
MR. HALLIDAY: Your Honor, these appear to be our 
signatures, but I don't know how it got 
on this document. 
THE COURT: And you don't have the other copy as an 
original that you photocopied? 
MR. HALLIDAY: Your Honor, I have our copies where we 
crossed it out. 
THE COURT: So you have what? 
MR. HALLIDAY: We have the copy that we submitted to 
the Court. 
THE COURT: Okay. But you don't have one with 
original signatures any place in your 
files or your client's? 
MR. HALLIDAY: No, because we just received the one 
release. 
THE COURT: You just received the one? 
MR. HALLIDAY: Just that one, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, how is it, then, that this 
doesn't have the interlineation that -
MR. HALLIDAY: I don't know anything about that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HALLIDAY: Because our copy has it. My affidavit 
and my client's affidavit is we crossed 
it out, plus my affidavit that 
11 
Mr. Gehris indicated that we didn't need 
to cross it out, that he understood it 
was only for property damage, not 
personal injury, and that - we crossed 
it out. 
(R. 123 at 17:8-19:5.) 
13. The court did not believe that the altered Release 
submitted by Ms. Nielsen's counsel was a genuine document. The 
original Release was a blue, pre-printed, standard Release form.7 
Both Ms. Nielsen and her attorney signed the Release the day 
after the settlement draft was issued on June 6, 1991. The 
Release was sent back to Ms. Hefferon's insurer, who stamped it 
on the reverse that it was received on June 7, 1991. The 
original Release has no deletions through the personal injury 
language. The altered Release contains interlineations that 
plaintiff's counsel admits he made; however the overwhelming 
evidence establishes that he had no authority to do so. 
14. The court held that the original Release was 
unambiguous and by its plain language settled a personal injury 
claim. (R. 123 at 26:10-22.) 
15. After considering all of the evidence offered by 
Ms. Nielsen, the trial court granted the defendant's Motion to 
7See color copy of the original Release attached in the Addendum. 
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Dismiss based on the best evidence rule and the impropriety of 
resorting to parol evidence because it found the original Release 
to be unambiguous. (R. 112-115.) 
16. Since the court held that the original Release 
preempted any lawsuit that would arise out of the automobile 
accident, it properly denied Ms. Nielsen's Motion for Leave to 
Amend her Complaint. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court soundly held that the best 
evidence rule requires the use of an original writing to prove 
its content. 
2. The trial court soundly dismissed Ms. Nielsen's 
Complaint with prejudice since she could not account for the 
deletions on her copy of the altered Release. 
3. The trial court soundly dismissed Ms. Nielsen's 
Complaint with prejudice since parol evidence is not admissible 
to contradict the terms of an unambiguous contract. 
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it denied plaintiff's Motion to Amend her Complaint to add claims 
of fraud and bad faith since she could not establish legally 
sufficient claims on either theory. 
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5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it denied Ms. Nielsen's Motion to Amend her Complaint because she 
was unable to convince the trial court that her altered Release 
reflected the agreement of the parties. 
6. Attorneys' fees and double costs should be awarded 
in this matter since Ms. Nielsen has brought a frivolous appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE REQUIRES THAT THE ORIGINAL WRITING 
BE USED TO PROVE ITS CONTENT. 
Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires that, 
to prove the content of a writing, the original writing is 
required in evidence. Its statutory counterpart, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-25-16, also requires that NX[t]here can be no evidence of the 
contents of a writing, other than the writing itself' except in a 
handful of cases that do not apply to this one. 
At oral argument on the Summary Judgment Motion, Ms. 
Nielsen's counsel requested to see the original Release for the 
first time since it was discovered, saying he would like to 
examine it "to see if it's a forgery." (R. 123 at 17:12-14.) 
After reviewing the signatures that were affixed to the original 
Release more than six years earlier, Ms. Nielsen's counsel 
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admitted that the signatures on the face of the document were, 
indeed, the authentic signatures of his client and himself. (R. 
123 at 18:3-5.) 
The trial court held that since "the original Release 
bears the signatures of plaintiff and her counsel, the content 
and scope of the parties' agreement must be determined from the 
original Release." (R. 113.) The court went on to hold that the 
parties' agreement unambiguously encompassed personal injury 
claims later pursued by Ms. Nielsen. (R. at 114.) 
The trial court correctly applied the law and 
determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed with 
respect to the use and authenticity of the original Release. 
Reasonable minds cannot differ that the original Release is the 
writing that must be used to prove its contents. Ms. Nielsen's 
counsel does not dispute that his and client's signatures are on 
the original Release. Nor does he dispute that only one original 
Release exists. No material fact exists which could make an 
issue of the original Release's authenticity. 
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POINT II 
WHEN A PARTY ATTEMPTS TO PRODUCE AN ALTERED WRITING INTO 
EVIDENCE, SHE MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE APPEARANCE OF THE ALTERATION 
IF IT IS TO BE CONSIDERED GENUINE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-17 requires: 
The party producing as genuine a writing 
which has been altered, or appears to have 
been altered after Its execution In a part 
material to the question In dispute must 
account for the appearance of alteration. He 
may show that the alteration was made by 
another without his concurrence, or was made 
with the consent of the parties affected by 
it, or otherwise properly or innocently made, 
or that the alteration does not change the 
meaning or language of the instrument. If he 
does this, he may give the writing In 
evidence, but not otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.) 
At oral argument on the Summary Judgment Motion, the 
trial court asked Ms. Nielsen's counsel why the original Release 
did not bear any interlineation of the personal injury language, 
like Ms. Nielsen's copy did. Ms. Nielsen's counsel replied, "I 
don't know anything about that." (R. 123 at 18: 20-23.) 
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Ms. Nielsen's counsel offered no evidence to establish 
that the alteration was made by someone else without his 
concurrence because he made the deletion himself. He admits that 
xxm the presence of my client, I crossed out the words'" relating 
to personal injury claims. (R. 58, f 10.) Nor did he offer any 
evidence that he made the deletion with the consent of the 
parties affected by it: he avers just the opposite—that Liberty 
Mutual's adjuster told him to ignore the personal injury 
language. Since he was skeptical about this, he says he decided 
to cross out the language. JEd. However, the original Releasd 
proves this statement inaccurate; no interlineation was made on 
the original. Therefore, plaintiff's arguments constitute a 
misrepresentation to this Court. 
Ms. Nielsen's counsel also does not claim that the 
deletion was properly or innocently made, or that the deletion 
does not change the meaning or language of the instrument. By 
deleting the personal injury language in his copy of the release, 
he must have intended to change the legal effect of the agreement 
and to create an opportunity to pursue a personal injury lawsuit. 
This alteration unilaterally renewed the obligations of Ms. 
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Hefferon's estate and its insurer to cover personal injuries 
asserted by Ms. Nielsen a year and a half after the release's 
execution. Ms. Nielsen cannot account for why her altered copy • 
has uninitialed and unacknowledged deletions and the original 
Release does not. Since she cannot properly account for the 
alterations, her copy cannot be admitted into evidence because it 
is not genuine. The trial court would not permit the altered 
Release into evidence, and neither should the Court of Appeals. 
POINT III 
PAROL EVIDENCE THAT CONTRADICTS THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF AN 
UNAMBIGUOUS AGREEMENT IS INADMISSIBLE. 
On June 6, 1991, Ms. Nielsen executed the original 
Release (R. 37), a color copy of which is attached to the 
Addendum of this Brief. It states, in relevant part: 
The undersigned hereby releases and forever 
discharges Mary Jane Hefferon and Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company . . . from all 
claims and demands, rights and causes of 
action of any kind the undersigned now has or 
hereafter may have on account of or in any 
way growing out of personal Injuries existing 
or which may exist which are known or unknown 
to me at the present time and property damage 
resulting or to result from an occurrence 
which happened on or about September 23, 
1990, and do hereby covenant to indemnify and 
save harmless the said party or parties from 
and against all claims and demands whatsoever 
on account of or in any way growing out of 
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said occurrence or its results both to person 
and property. This release expresses a full 
and complete SETTLEMENT of a liability 
claimed and denied . . . 
(Emphasis added.) Above the space for Plaintiff's signature, the 
Release states in large, bold capital letters, xxYOU ARE MAKING A 
FINAL SETTLEMENT. THIS IS A RELEASE: READ BEFORE SIGNING." It 
is signed by plaintiff Vickie M. Nielsen and witnessed by her 
attorney, Paul M. Halliday, Jr. 
Compromise and settlement agreements are contractual in 
nature and should be construed and enforced under general 
contract principles. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
A party to a contract may not resort to parol evidence to attempt 
to vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of a 
contract. Hall v. Process Instruments and Control, Inc./ 890 
P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995). 
In Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court explained that a court may 
consider a writing in light of surrounding circumstances in order 
to make a preliminary determination as to whether there is any 
ambiguity in the contract. id. at 268. If, after considering 
all credible parol evidence offered to prove the intentions of 
the parties, the court determines that the language of the 
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contract is not ambiguous, then the parties' intentions must be 
determined solely from the language of the contract/' Id, 
After considering all the evidence presented, the trial 
court soundly held that the language of the original Release had 
no ambiguity, that there was no need to resort to parol evidence, 
and that the parties' intent would be solely determined by the 
plain terms of the agreement. (R. 113-114.) 
Once she settled all her demands and the agreement was 
fully executed, Ms. Nielsen cannot now be heard to say that she 
did not really settle all demands but that, on the contrary, she 
reserved her personal injury claim. It is implausible that 
Ms. Nielsen misunderstood the force, effect and import of the 
agreement she signed and her attorney witnessed, or that she did 
not know that she discharged all claims and demands she had or 
might have against Ms. Hefferon or her insurer arising from the 
automobile accident. In exchange for a sum of money, Ms. Nielsen 
waived all her claims against the defendant. The terms of the 
original Release were plain and unambiguous. When she signed the 
original Release, she assumed the risk that she could develop 
personal injuries that would go uncompensated. Ms. Nielsen had 
the opportunity to exercise her freedom of choice as between 
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executing the agreement or not doing so. She consciously, and 
with legal advice, chose to execute the original Release; it 
cannot be said that this was not voluntary on her part. This is 
not a case where an adjuster shoved a release under the nose of a 
recently injured person; Ms. Nielsen had an attorney for several 
months who endeavored to secure a settlement for her. 
In submitting parol evidence, Ms. Nielsen is asking the 
Court to hold that, although the original Release expressly 
includes known and unknown personal injuries and property damage, 
in fact it only applies to property damage. Even if parol 
evidence were permitted to vary the terms of the agreement, the 
credible parol evidence will still not alter the parties' 
intentions. Ms. Nielsen's reliance upon parol evidence to 
rewrite the original Release is misplaced, and it should be 
construed according to its clear and unambiguous language. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD 
CLAIMS OF FRAUD AND BAD FAITH SINCE 
SHE COULD NOT ESTABLISH LEGALLY SUFFICIENT 
CLAIMS ON EITHER COUNT. 
Fraud is never presumed, and a contract should not be 
adjudged void for fraud unless the allegations and proofs of 
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fraud are clear, precise, and indubitable if it is to reach a 
jury. Kellev v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941). 
"It has been more than once held that it is error to submit a 
question of fraud to the jury upon slight parol evidence to 
overturn a written instrument." (Citation omitted, emphasis 
added.) 116 P.2d 385. The issue is not for the jury when 
reasonable minds cannot find the facts to support material and 
fraudulent alteration of documents. Zions First Nat'l. v. Rocky 
Mt. Irr., 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1990). 
To show successfully that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Ms. Nielsen's Motion to Amend her Complaint 
to add claims of fraud and bad faith, Ms. Nielsen had the burden 
to prove that the release was procured by fraud and bad faith and 
that she could legally establish these sufficient claims. Lamb 
v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974). However, if in fact 
fraud or bad faith occurred here, it is obvious that it was not 
on the part of the defendant or its insurer. 
To show that her fraud claim was legally sufficient, 
Ms. Nielsen must have stated with particularity the circumstances 
supporting each element of fraud. Otsuka Elec. v. Imaging 
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Specialists, 937 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App. 1997). The elements 
of fraud are: 
1. That a representation was made; 
2. Concerning a presently existing material 
fact; 
3. Which is false; 
4. Which the representor either (a) knew to 
be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation; 
5. For the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it; 
6. That the other party acting reasonably 
and in ignorance of its falsity; 
7. Did upon rely upon it; 
8. And was thereby induced to act; 
9. To his injury and damage. 
Otsuka, 937 P.2d 1278, citing Pace v. Parnsh, 247 P.2d 273, 274-
75 (1952); accord Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 
1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996). 
The only representation that Ms. Nielsen claims was 
made to her was that Mr. Gehris of Liberty Mutual allegedly told 
her attorney that, in spite of the fact that the original Release 
contained language that included the release of personal injury 
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claims, she should go ahead and ignore that language and pretend 
it wasn't there. (R. at 58.) However, it cannot be said that 
Ms. Nielsen and her attorney acted reasonably and in ignorance of 
this falsity, when they have each provided affidavits to the 
effect that they did not trust Mr. Gehns's statements and that 
they wanted the personal injury language out of the release. (R. 
58, § 10; R. 53, § 6.) They did not rely upon Mr. Gehns's 
representations nor were they induced to act by them. 
In order to proffer a legally sufficient claim of bad 
faith, Ms. Nielsen needed to show that Ms. Hefferon or her 
insurer acted in bad faith. A finding of bad faith is a mixed 
question of law and fact that turns on a factual determination of 
a party's subjective intent. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald/ 961 P.2d 
305, 316 (Utah 1998), citing Tavlor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 
163, 171 (Utah App. 1989). The trial court is given relatively 
broad discretion in concluding whether bad faith has been 
sufficiently shown. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) . 
Ms. Nielsen had the burden to show that one or more of 
these bad faith factors existed: 1) the party lacked an honest 
belief in the propriety of the activities in question; 2) the 
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party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or 3) 
the party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the 
activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others, 
Valcarce, 961 P.2d 316, citing Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1983) . 
Ms. Nielsen asserted none of these bad faith factors to 
the court below. She could not support such assertions because 
she had counsel who was negotiating a settlement for her and it 
could not be said that the Liberty Mutual claims adjuster was 
operating with any advantage over Ms. Nielsen. Indeed, Ms. 
Hefferon and her insurer were the ones who were compromised by 
the proffer of Ms. Nielsen's altered Release and her assertions 
of fraud and bad faith. The trial court's concluding remarks to 
defendant Ms. Hefferon's counsel are worth repeating here: 
The record should reflect, counsel, that I'm 
going to return the original release to you. 
At some point in the future, it may become 
important as to whether this document is in 
existence. I don't want it in the court 
files to disappear or get lost someplace. 
The party who has the most at stake ought to 
guard this, and I return it to you. 
(R. 123 at 26:23-27:4.) 
The trial court's denial of Ms. Nielsen's Motion to 
Amend her Complaint was clearly not an abuse of discretion since 
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Ms. Nielsen could not remotely establish legally sufficient 
claims of fraud or baa faith. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MS. NIELSEN'S 
MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT BECAUSE SHE WAS 
UNABLE TO PERSUADE THE COURT THAT THE ALTERED RELEASE 
REFLECTED THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. 
As stated above, the trial court found that the 
original Release was authenticated and signed by Ms. Nielsen and 
her attorney. The court was not persuaded that the altered 
Release with the deleted terms was a genuine writing that was 
admissible evidence. 
Since the altered Release was inadmissible, the court 
had no basis upon which to grant Ms. Nielsen's Motion to Amend 
her Complaint. The altered Release did not reflect the agreement 
of the parties; it only reflected the desires of Ms. Nielsen that 
she be able to present a personal injury claim she discovered a 
year-and-a-half after the automobile accident at issue. Had the 
court been persuaded that a reasonable juror might believe 
Ms. Nielsen's altered Release was genuine, then it would have 
permitted new claims to be brought. The trial court was not 
fooled by Ms. Nielsen's deletions and neither should the Court of 
Appeals be misled by such. 
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POINT VI 
MS. NIELSEN'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS 
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS SHOULD BE AWARDED 
TO THE DEFENDANT FOR HAVING TO DEFEND IT. 
When an appeal is not grounded m fact, not warranted 
by existing law, nor based on a good faith argument to extend 
existing law, it is deemed frivolous. Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure, 33 (b) . The overwhelming evidence shows that 
Ms. Nielsen's challenge to the original Release was unfounded, 
because her attorney admits that he made the interlineations on 
the altered copy (R. 58 f 10), but he had utterly failed to show 
any permission to do so. Specifically, the original Release 
contains no interlineations, so it is apparent that plaintiff's 
counsel made changes only to a copy of the Release and only after 
the unaltered original Release was signed. Ms. Nielsen lacked a 
scintilla of credible evidence to establish a fraud or bad faith 
claim, so her appeal is unfounded and has caused the defendant a 
substantial loss of time and expense in having to meet these 
groundless allegations. It is appropriate and just in this case 
to award attorneys' fees and double costs for the defense of this 
matter. 
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In the face of the obvious fact that the original 
Release is legitimate and contains no alterations or 
interlineations to the personal injury language, counsel for 
plaintiff has persisted in making such outlandish allegations as 
fraud and misconduct. He has attempted to paint both Liberty 
Mutual and defense counsel with that brush. (R. 48, 49, and 95.) 
This is improper and unprofessional in any event, but it is made 
much worse by plaintiff's counsel's own conduct herein, and his 
complete inability to substantiate his claims. 
The facts have established by clear and convincing 
evidence that only one original Release existed, that the 
signatures affixed to the agreement are, in fact, those of 
Ms. Nielsen and her attorney, and that - although there is no 
eyewitness proof - the only source of the deletion of the 
personal injury terms was Ms. Nielsen's attorney. These clear-
as-crystal facts had to have been obvious to Ms. Nielsen's 
counsel, and he should have advised her of the frivolity of the 
appeal. Sanctions, including those beyond the scope of this 
appeal, are undoubtedly warranted, but at least this Court should 
use Rule 33 to make pLaintiff and her attorney think twice before 
bringing such an unwarranted, bad faith appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court soundly decided that the only original 
Release that bore the authentic signatures of Ms. Nielsen and her 
attorney was a genuine document and was the best evidence of the 
parties' intentions. Any use of parol evidence would have been 
improper since the document is plain and unambiguous. Ms. 
Nielsen, with the advice of counsel, contracted away any 
potential claims she might have had against Ms. Hefferon or her 
insurer. The altered Release she produced was not genuine and 
was inadmissible. Her legally empty claims of fraud and bad 
faith were dismissed by the trial court and she was denied the 
ability to Amend her Complaint. Because Ms. Nielsen's attorney 
knew her claims were completely groundless and her appeal far-
fetched, she should be required to bear the fees and costs of Ms. 
Hefferon and her insurer in their defense of this appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th is *) 
A 
day of May, 1999, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage 
prepaid, on this ^ ^  day of May, 1999, to the following: 
Paul M. Halliday, Jr. 
Paul M. Halliday 
HALLIDAY, WATKINS & HENRIE 
376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
8871-363 
251146 
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ADDENDUM 
RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT " F CLAIM 
For the sole consideration nf FOUR THOUSAND JONE^OTNDRED 
a l l l i e n s ) — 
H|AL 667-013587-05 
(File No.) 
0 ( t o i n c l u d e a n y a n d 
.dollars ( S 4 1 ^ 6 - 5 0 
the undersigned hereby releases and forever discharges MARY JANE HEFFERON AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. 
and all other persons, firms and corporations from all claims and demands, rights and causes of action of any kind the undersigned 
now has or hereafter may have on account of or in any way growing out of Personal Injuries existing or which may exist which are known 
or unknown to me at the present time and Property Damage resulting or to result from an occurrence which happened on or about 
23 SEPTEMBER 19 90
 f a n c | d 0 hereby covenant to indemnify and save harmless the said party or parties from 
and against all claims and demands whatsoever on account of or in any way growing out of said occurrence or its results both to person 
and property. This release expresses a full and complete SETTLEMENT of a liability claimed and denied, regardless of the adequacy 
of the above consideration, and the acceptance of this release shall not operate as an admission of liability on the part of anyone nor as 
an estoppel, waiver or bar with respect to any claim the party or parties released may have against the undersigned. Witness my hand and seal. 
(1) Dated 
YOU ARE MAKING A FINAL SETTLEMENT 
THIS IS A RELEASE: READ BEFORE SIGNING. 
(2) 
I VICKIE NIELSON 
(Address)^" H^/M^)^ ,-AU/faMi. (Signature) 
( 5 ) • 
(Witness' Signature) 
(3). (L-S.) 
(Signature) 
(Address) 
A j S C - 2 5 0 R 5 Printed in U.S..A 
*^ o 
< * & & # 
78-25-16. Parol evidence of contents of writings - When 
admissible. 
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other 
than the writing itself, except in the following cases: 
(1) when the original has been lost or destroyed, in which 
case proof of the loss or destruction must first be made; 
(2) when the original is in the possession of the party 
against whom the evidence is offered and he fails to produce it 
after reasonable notice; 
(3) when the original is a record or other document in the 
custody of a public officer; 
(4) when the original has been recorded, and the record or 
a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this code or other 
statute; 
(5) when the original consists of numerous accounts or 
other documents which cannot be examined in court without great 
loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the 
general result of the whole. 
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a 
profession or calling, or any department or agency of government, 
in the regular course of business or activity has kept or 
recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or 
combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or 
event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or 
all of the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any 
photographic, photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature 
photographic, or other process which accurately reproduces or 
forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the 
original may be destroyed in the regular course of business 
unless its preservation is required by law; and such reproduc-
tion, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evi-
dence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative 
proceeding whether the original is in existence or not, an 
enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise 
admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in 
existence and available for inspection under direction of court. 
The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or 
facsimile, does not preclude admission of the original. 
In the cases mentioned in Subsections (3) and (4), a copy of 
the original, or of the record, must be produced; in those 
mentioned in Subsections (1) and (2), either a copy or oral 
evidence of the contents must be given. 
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Rule 15. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading 
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 2 0 days after it 
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party 
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be 
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of 
attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may 
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is 
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based 
on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such 
as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, 
or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or 
upon its own motion. A party may request damages under this rule 
only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition 
under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a 
party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, 
the court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or 
both an order to show cause why such damages should not be 
awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations 
which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days 
in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause 
shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral 
argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be 
awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
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78-27-56. Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad 
faith - Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if 
the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court, or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provision of Subsection (1). 
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